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Whether the employer is private or public, large or small, a manufac-
turer or a service organization, it is likely that he offers a "fringe benefit"
package to his employees. This may include a pension at retirement,
hospital, medical or dental insurance, group life insurance, disability
income protection, paid vacations, or even sabbatical leave. Whether
negotiated by collective bargaining or simply offered by the employer, the
rapid growth of fringe benefits reflects concern with comprehensive
lifetime financial security, even at the expense of lesser increases in take-
home pay.
In one form or another, these fringes are forms of compensation to
the employee. Louisiana, together with most other jurisdictions, has
rejected the argument that they are mere gratuities, even when instituted
unilaterally by the employer.' Almost all fringes relieve the prudent
employee of expenses he would (or should) incur in the interest of his own
economic security. The not-so-prudent employee is protected against
himself by the intercession of the employer, the union, or both. Moreover,
due to economies of size and certain federal tax incentives, a real cost
savings may be realized both by employer and employee. And it goes
without saying that the deferred compensation phenomenon has spawned a
gigantic new industry of its own. 2
The problem. Benefits such as health insurance are earned and
disbursed more or less on a current basis. Other benefits such as those
payable at death, upon disability, or at retirement, while "earned" cur-
rently, are necessarily deferred as to disbursement. Births, deaths, separa-
tions, divorces and remarriages may occur in the interim. Moreover, some
plans provide for delayed vesting of the right to benefits. 3 And the courts
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976). Chief Justice
Sanders and Justice Marcus dissented.
2. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NEW PENSION
REFORM LAW 5 (1974); Comment, The Relation of Community Propertyand Forced
Heirship to Employee Retirement Plans, 51 TUL. L. REV. 645 (1977).
3. A plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) may provide for delayed vesting but minimum vesting requirements are
imposed. Full vesting may be delayed for 10 years; or for 15 years if gradual vesting
commences after 5 years; or "rule of 45" may apply, requiring benefits to begin
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in a number of states are struggling to integrate deferred compensation into
traditional property systems.
Several recent Louisiana decisions have attempted to reconcile de-
ferred compensation with community property and forced heirship. Prior
to T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery4 it was generally assumed that
benefits were owned by the employee and disbursed at his direction. Upon
retirement, he chose how his benefits would be paid (e.g., lump sum, joint
and survivor annuity) and who would receive them both during his
lifetime and after his death, all without reference to the community
property system or the demands of forced heirs. To justify this freedom,
the Fourth Circuit analogized death benefits to the proceeds of life insur-
ance, thereby freeing them from most claims of forced heirs and commu-
nity spouses. 5 But the insurance analogy was rejected by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in T.L. James. In its view, deferred compensation "earn-
ed" during the existence of the community accrues to the benefit of both
spouses. In T.L. James the employee designated his older son to receive
all death benefits. His surviving spouse claimed that she was entitled to
half the death benefit "earned" during the existence of the marriage. His
younger son claimed a share as forced heir. The supreme court agreed with
both of them.
However, the court did apply the life insurance analogy in one
narrow but important area. The employee attempted to direct benefits by
executing a designation form not in testamentary form. The spouse and
younger son claimed the death benefits should be distributed in accordance
with the laws of intestacy. Here the court drew the line. With an eye to the
adverse death tax consequences if benefits were payable to the succession,
it sustained the designation of the eldest son, but subject to an accounting
to the surviving spouse and to his half-brother. 6
vesting at 50% when the sum of age and service reaches 45, but in any event 50%
vesting must occur after 10 years' service. 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (Supp. IV 1974).
4. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
5. Succession of Mendoza, 288 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Succes-
sion of Rockvoan, 141 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
6. Death benefits from qualified plans are excluded from the gross estate for
federal estate tax purposes provided they are payable to a beneficiary other than
the employee's "executor or estate." I.R.C. § 2039(C). If payable in accordance
with the designation form, the exemption would apply. If payable pursuant to the
laws of intestacy, the exemption would have been lost. The writer understands that
the Internal Revenue Service takes the position that the beneficiary's obligation to
account to others has no adverse effect on the exemption. Louisiana inheritance tax
laws contain a similar provision. LA. R.S. 47:2404(C) (Supp. 1976).
[Vol. 38
FORUM JURIDICUM
The T.L. James case was complicated by the fact that the employee
had been married twice. The company pension and profit-sharing plans
had been instituted during the first marriage. Upon divorce, neither was
considered in the marital property settlement. His participation in the plan
continued during the second marriage. In the court's view death benefits
"earned" during the first marriage represented unpartitioned assets of the
first community. Further, to the extent they were "earned" during the
second community, an accounting was due the surviving spouse. The
difficulty lay in determining what was "earned" by which community and
in how to account.
Vesting. Each plan provided for gradual "vesting" at the rate of
5% per year until at the end of 20 years' participation the employee
became "fully-vested." Thus, had he died during the 15th year, his
beneficiary would have been entitled only to 75% of his maximum death
benefit. Although fully-vested before he died, he was only partially vested
when divorced from his first wife.
Classification. A recurring problem in community property juris-
dictions is classifying property purchased both with community and sepa-
rate earnings. Two basic approaches have been employed. In Louisiana
and Texas the separate or community "character" of the property is fixed
at the time it is acquired. Hence, the "inception of title" approach. If
improved with funds from the other estate or if purchased, in part, with
funds of the other estate, the original classification holds, subject to an
accounting.7 Thus a policy on the husband's life purchased prior to
marriage is always his separate property, even though most of the pre-
miums are paid with community funds. If the proceeds are payable other
than to the surviving spouse, an accounting is required for premiums paid
by the community.' In other community property states, such as Califor-
nia and Washington, a "proportionate interest" approach is used. Where
property is acquired both with separate and community funds, each estate
owns an undivided interest in proportion to its contributions. 9 Thus, the
7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2408. See Succession of Le Blanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So.
223 (1917); Succession of Verneville, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908).
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2408. See In re Moseman's Estate, 38 La. Ann. 219
(1881).
9. See, e.g., Forbes v. Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 324, 257 P.2d 721 (1953);
McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); In re Coffey's
Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938).
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insurance policy in our example above would be owned by the husband's
separate estate and by the community in proportion to the premiums paid
by each.
Given the facts in T.L. James, one can readily appreciate the difficul-
ty of applying either approach. What was "earned" during the existence
of the first community during which the employee's interest in the plan
vested at the rate of 5% per year? What was "earned" by the second
community during which the employee became fully-vested? What effect,
if any, should be given to gradual vesting? Before attempting an answer,
let us look more carefully at the plans involved.
T. L. James and Co. offered its employees two very common plans.
One was a "defined-benefit pension plan" under which specific death,
disability and retirement benefits were guaranteed to the employee. Bene-
fits were determined by a formula tied to salary and years of service. The
plan was "funded" by the employer's annual contribution to a trust from
which all benefits were paid. The amount of each contribution was
determined by actuarial analysis of the employee-participants-their ages,
projected retirement dates, estimated benefits, claims experience, etc. No
separate account was kept for any specific employee, nor was the actuary
or anyone else able to determine what proportion of the employer's
contribution in any given year was made for the benefit of any given
employee.
The company also offered a "defined-contribution profit sharing
plan" whereby a stated portion of company profits were contributed to a
trust for the benefit of each employee-participant. A separate account was
maintained for each employee which represented the sole source from
which benefits could be paid at death, disability or retirement. The value
of each account fluctuated with market values, gains, income and forfei-
tures from other accounts. The employer guaranteed no benefits. The
company's undertaking was limited to the making of the required contri-
butions and to prudent administration of the trust through a bank trustee.
Both plans were "qualified" under federal tax law, permitting the
employer to deduct current contributions and permitting the employee to
defer income tax until disbursement. 0 Neither plan required or permitted
contributions by the employee.
10. I.R.C. §§ 162, 212, 404 (employer deductions); I.R.C. §§ 72, 402 (employee
deferrals). See generally M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS 353-90 (1977);
Reimer, Tax Planning for Distributions from Qualified Corporate Retirement Plans,
I J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 288 (1977).
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Allocation to the community. In approaching the allocation prob-
lem, the supreme court followed a somewhat erratic course. The tradition-
al "inception of title" approach would have required the court to deter-
mine when the employee's interest in each plan was originally acquired.
This would have been difficult. His interest might have been "acquired"
when he first became eligible to "participate" in the plan, i.e. the year in
which contributions were first made on his behalf, although he may have
had no vested interest until several years thereafter. The court might have
determined that he "acquired" his interest in the plan only with the onset
of vesting-the time at which he first acquired a non-forfeitable right to
benefits. Both of these events occurred during the first community. Thus,
had the court chosen "inception of title" approach, both plans would have
been classified as unpartitioned assets of the first community. But at its
dissolution, neither plan was fully vested. By continued employment
during the second community, vesting increased at the rate of 5% per year
until he became fully vested in both plans. In a real sense, some of his
.interest was "earned" during the second community.
Following traditional community property concepts, this increase
during the second community would have entitled the surviving spouse to
an accounting. But on what basis? Half the amounts contributed by the
employer during the second community? Or half the increase in ultimate
benefits accruing during the second community? Or accounting by some
other approach? Merely to state the problem is to understand, in part, the
difficulties facing the court. And in its solution, new ground was plowed.
The court began by recognizing the interest of both communities. But
rather than classify the benefits as assets of the first, the court adopted
what amounts to a "proportionate interest" approach.
[Tjhe value of the right to share proportionately in the fund, which is
contractually acquired by virtue of each contribution, falls into the
community during which the contribution is made; for by each
contribution, when made, the employee (or his beneficiary or estate)
has acquired a right to share prorata in the proceeds ultimately
payable to the funds."
In measuring the effect of each contribution on ultimate benefits, the court
chose to ignore the vesting provisions of the plans. Moreover, it assumed
that the amount of contributions made in any year to either plan could be
ascertained:
11. 332 So. 2d at 851 (emphasis added).
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The value of each contribution paid into the fund shall be a share of
the fund of the same proportion that the contribution's amount bears
to the total amount of all contributions paid into the fund to the
employee's account. 2
Thus contributions made before vesting commenced, after vesting was
completed, or in between, were given the same relative weight. Moreover,
the court assumed quite erroneously that a separate account was main-
tained for each employee in both plans. This -was true only of the defined-
contribution profit sharing plan. Lastly, it redefined "vesting":
[T]he right-to-share acquired during the community (arising from
each contribution made during the marriage) does not contractually
vest until the employee's death, retirement or withdrawal from em-
ployment.' 3 (Emphasis added).
Legal analysis of a plan. The court was in unfamiliar territory and its
opinion reflects this uncertainty. For example, the majority seems to think
an employee is compensated currently through the medium of contribu-
tions to the trust-that employer contributions to the trust immediately
become the employee's money. Yet it seems to recognize that it is not his,
for it speaks of benefits vesting only at the time they become payable.
Perhaps some analysis will help clear the air.
Reduced to simplest terms, both plans were rather complex mecha-
nisms securing the employer's promise to pay future compensation. The
employee "earned" no more, and "owned" no more than his employer's
promise to pay. Enforcement of the company's promise was limited,
however, to the assets of the trust-or, in a manner of speaking, the
promise was enforceable only in rem.
The company's promise was not bargained for-both plans were
adopted unilaterally by the company. As time went on, each employee
became entitled to rely on that promise. But the company's promise was
not unconditional. Its enforceability was subject to a number of contingen-
cies. It could not be enforced until vesting began, and then only to the
extent of the vesting provisions. In civil law terminology, the company's
in rem promise was subject to a series of resolutory conditions depending
on future and uncertain events. 4 With progressive vesting these resolutory
12. Id. at 852.
13. Id.
14. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2021, 2045-47. The court's characterization is "suspen-
sive." This might be persuasive but for the annual contributions which indicate that
the employer is bound from the time the employee becomes a participant. The
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conditions gradually subside until at the employee's death, disability or
retirement, the promise becomes unconditional.
In reality, the trust funds were only security for the enforcement of
the company promise. Annual contributions were required by each plan in
order to secure the deductibility and deferral of federal income tax. And
the tax advantages turned upon the certainty of payment provided by the
trust. Had there been no trust fund and no requirement of current contribu-
tions, the company's promise would have remained enforceable, though
unsecured. Thus the supreme court's approach to allocation of benefits on
the basis of the security given rather than the promise earned seems to wag
the dog. To allocate by reference to trust assets never owned by the
employee is to miss the mark.
Allocation between communities. The controversy in T.L. James
involved benefits-the end product of the promises made. Those promises
were earned, in part, during each community. Therefore, if benefits
represent funded promises, and those promises were earned as a result of
specific employment activity, and that activity took place during different
matrimonial property regimes, how should traditional community property
concepts be applied?
Assume that the first community was dissolved at the end of the
seventh year of the 20-year vesting period. At that point the employee had
earned a non-forfeitable 35% interest in plan benefits. Community proper-
ty law credits the spouse with half of this vested interest. If it is a defined-
contribution (profit sharing) plan, the spouse should receive 17 1/2% of
the value of the account as of the termination of the community and should
participate in any gains or losses or income attributable to that interest
until disbursement. If it is a defined-benefit (pension) plan, she should be
permitted to receive an amount equal to 17 1/2% of the death, disability or
retirement benefits, but only that portion of the amount promised at the
dissolution of the community.
The supreme court's approach to allocating a defined-contribution
plan seems adequate except that it gives no effect to vesting nor to the
value of money over time. If the employee's account is worth more than
the total contributions to it, this excess could come from only two sources:
earnings and gain on assets or forfeitures from the accounts of other
vesting requirement does not seem to suspend the employer's promise; it only
permits discharge from an otherwise binding promise. See Due v. Due, 331 So. 2d
858 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), aff'd, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977).
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participants. (Of course, it is possible that the value of the employee's
account will be less than the total contributions made because of depressed
market conditions or unfortunate investment.) The obligation to determine
how these intricate variables have affected each plan year during the
existence of one or more communities, might well be more than the law
should require. However, by giving no effect to vesting, the supreme
court's approach tends to distort. For example, if the employee marries
while 10% vested and divorces while 60% vested, the community has
"earned" only a 50% interest in ultimate benefits represented by employ-
er contributions made during that period. On the other hand, if the
employee remarries, contributions made during the second community
will vest at a rate exceeding 60% because of some vesting "earned"
during the first community. But no court we know of has required a spouse
to account for earning power acquired during marriage, and likely none
.will.
In allocating death benefits, perhaps most of these subtleties could as
well be ignored. The problem of how to allocate future retirement benefits
is not so simple, especially where a current value is required. Assume the
community is dissolved by divorce prior to retirement. The amount of
contributions made during the community may be known but, of course,
the total contributions ultimately made to the plan cannot be ascertained.
The supreme court's formula will work only if the non-employee spouse
agrees to accept his share of the benefits "if, as and when received,"-
allowing time for that share to be ascertained. 5 Should the non-employee
spouse desire immediate calculation of his interest, the supreme court's
formula will not work.
Disability benefits. In cases involving workmen's compensation
and personal injury awards, recent Louisiana decisions hold that if the
onset of disability occurs prior to marriage, disability benefits accrue to
the employee's separate estate; 6 if disability occurs during marriage,
benefits representing lost income during the marriage should fall into the
community, but after separation, divorce or the death of the non-employee
spouse, subsequent benefits accrue to the employee's separate estate.1
7
Most plans treat disability compensation as early retirement. But there are
15. The "if, as and when" approach was developed by the Fourth Circuit in
Lynch v. Lawrence, 293 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 295 So. 2d 809
& 814 (1974).
16. Broussard v. Broussard, 340 So. 2d 1309 (La. 1976).
17. West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975).
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good reasons not to allocate on that basis. Normal retirement ordinarily
means that both spouses are no longer in the work force. But the disability
retirement of one spouse may well provoke the other to seek employment.
Moreover, after separation or divorce the disabled spouse may have no
other source of income. For these reasons, I think disability retirement
benefits should be treated as substitutes for lost income attributable to the
disability and allocated between the -spouses in the same manner as
workmen's compensation benefits.
Distributions from defined benefit plans. Allocation of benefits
from defined-benefit plans presents problems which are more complex
than the supreme court acknowledged. If the amount contributed each year
on behalf of each employee could be ascertained, what would such data
tell us? I question its relevance. The purpose of contributions to defined-
benefit plans is to cover the actuarial probability that certain benefits will
become payable during the plan year to certain predictable members of the
group. Predictability will vary with employee mix. As an employee grows
older, the probability of his death during a given plan year may increase
and thus require a larger contribution to cover that risk. A younger
employee paid the same wages and entitled to the same benefits would
require a smaller contribution to maintain actuarial soundness. Unusually
large claims during a given year might require an unusually large contribu-
tion during the following year to maintain actuarial soundness, whereas an
unusual number of layoffs might generate forfeitures which would reduce
required contributions for the subsequent years. Claims for disability
benefits may vary with the hazards of work-thus the contribution for an
older office worker may be less than that contributed to defray a potential
claim by a younger laborer. Because of these variables related to actuarial
experience, but sometimes only remotely related to a given employee's
earnings, the supreme court's approach is unrealistic; and if such data are
unavailable, the court's approach is simply unworkable. This seems to be
the case. Several competent actuaries advise that the amount contributed
to a defined-benefit plan for a given employee in a given plan year cannot
be calculated. A different approach seems necessary. Whether the plan
defines contributions or defines benefits, separation and divorce frequent-
ly require that a current value be assigned to the benefits accumulated by
the employee spouse. For instance, the non-employee spouse may wish to
release his interest in the plan in exchange for assets of equivalent value.
There ought to be a way to calculate a current value-and I suggest there is
one.
1977]
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Current value-defined contributions. The value of the employee's
account in a defined contribution plan is readily ascertainable
(with or without giving effect to vesting), depending upon the allocation
approach selected. In this instance, the value of the employer's promise
can be measured by the value of the security-the employee's claim on
the assets then in the trust. As indicated earlier, the supreme court's
approach which ignores vesting in allocating defined-contribution benefits
tends to give the non-employee spouse the benefit of forfeitures and
contribution buildup on benefits not vested during the first community,
thereby reducing the effects of vesting subsequent to dissolution. On the
other hand, the employee (or a subsequent community) will have the
benefit of vesting which accrued during the first marriage. The effect of
the supreme court's approach is a compromise which ignores vesting, and
perhaps it should be-at least for defined-contribution plans. But may
vesting be equitably ignored in allocating defined-benefit plans?
Current value-defined benefits. Suppose the employee is married
at a time when he is already 10% vested in a defined-benefit plan. In the
year he becomes 60% vested he is divorced. He dies 10 years thereafter
and a death benefit of $100,000 becomes payable. Assuming further that
had he died the year he was divorced, an employee paid the same, but with
more longevity, would have earned a fully-vested death benefit of
$60,000. (The increase in death benefit after divorce was due to a combi-
nation of raises in salary and longevity combined with general increases in
the plan benefit formula.) Since he was only 60% vested, had he died upon
divorce only $36,000 would have been payable. Five-sixths of that benefit
or $30,000 vested during the community and could be deemed so "earn-
ed." Thus, arguably the divorced spouse's share of the death benefit is
$15,000.
Suppose he had survived until retirement and become entitled to
monthly retirement benefits. Let us use the same numbers in this different
context. At the date of retirement, the promised monthly benefit had a
present actuarial value of $100,000. At the date of divorce, a fully-vested
retirement benefit would have had a present actuarial value of $60,000.
But since it was only 60% vested, its then present actuarial value was only
$36,000. Since 5/6ths of the vesting accrued during the first community, a
present value of only $30,000 vested, of which one-half or $15,000
accrued to the non-employee spouse. Accordingly, the spouse should be
entitled to $15,000/$100,000 or 15% of each installment if, as and when
FORUM JURIDICUM
paid. If no effect were given to vesting, she might have been entitled to as
much as 30% which, under the circumstances, seems excessive. For the
lack of a suitable "trade-off," it seems that vesting should be considered
here.
Contributory plans. In some instances, both types of plans will
permit or require employee contributions. Presumably these contributions
are "earned" in the year contributed. Employee contributions to defined-
contribution plans should cause no difficulty in allocation. Simply add
them to the employer's contribution and fold the sum into the calculation.
I suggest that employee contributions to the defined-benefit plans should
be allocated on the basis of benefits purchased, rather than amounts
contributed and thus folded into the calculations outlined above.
Self-employed plans. The "Individual Retirement Account" or
IRA permitted by the Employee Retirement Income Act of 197418 and the
qualified self-employed retirement plans (HR 10) or Keogh plans 19 which
do not guarantee benefits, could be allocated on the same basis as a
qualified corporate defined-contribution plan. If the Keogh plan does
guarantee benefits, then the above defined-benefit approach would seem
equally applicable.
Unfunded plans. This leaves for discussion the plans for which no
annual contribution is made or those to which annual contributions are not
sufficiently related to permit the types of calculations discussed above. In
this category are many government-sponsored plans and various non-
qualified private plans. Most of these do not provide for gradual vesting.
For example, there is no vesting in military retirement plans until the
serviceman reaches retirement age. 20 The same may be said for most
federal, state and municipal plans. To the extent such plans are contribu-
tory, the employee who fails to qualify for retirement benefits is entitled
only to a refund of his contributions, with or without interest, upon
termination of employment. Should a state employee, eligible for retire-
ment upon completing 30 years employment, marry five years after
employment and divorce 15 years thereafter, some Louisiana intermediate
appellate courts have held that the community has "earned" only those
18. I.R.C. §§ 408, 409; M. CANAN, supra note 10, at 113-32.
19. I.R.C. §§ 401(C), 404. See M. CANAN, supra note 10, at 133-48.
20. See Moon v. Moon, 345 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Swope v.
Mitchell, 324 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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contributions. 2 ' This seems incorrect since, upon completion of 30 years,
those contributions will have ripened into guaranteed benefits. Moreover,
most plans would not permit the withdrawal of contributions solely by
reason of divorce (or any other reason) and thus as a practical matter
would remain as unpartitioned assets of the community until termination of
employment, death, disability or eventual retirement. If such contributions
can be partitioned in anticipation of these events, and they have a chance
of ripening into guaranteed benefits, their division as contributions rather
than as potential benefits seems to short-change the non-employee spouse.
Accordingly, I think it appropriate to allocate eventual benefits. And
where there is no vesting schedule, it would seem appropriate to presume
that they vest equally and annually.
Forced heirs. T.L. James requires that benefits be subject to the
claims of forced heirs. This can occur in a variety of situations. For
example, the non-employee spouse may die, thus dissolving the communi-
ty. Whereas no benefits become payable currently, a value of the deceased
spouse's interest in benefits must be ascertained and that sum added to the
active mass in order to calculate the legitime. Moreover, if the legitime of
forced heirs is not satisfied from other sources, the heirs or legatees of the
non-employee spouse are presumably entitled to claim a share of the
benefits by an action in reduction. If a non-employee wife dies at age 50,
survived by children of the marriage, those children will be entitled to a
portion of their mother's community interest in their father's retirement
plan since they are her forced heirs. If he has remarried prior to retirement,
his monthly benefits must be shared between the new community and the
children of the first marriage-at least to the extent they are forced heirs.
And if this is the case, retirement benefits are being paid to members of
the work force! We need go no further than T.L. James for a concrete
example. The employee died leaving two sons entitled as forced heirs to
share one-half of his estate. Had he named his second wife as beneficiary,
her interest would have been reduced not only by the claim of the first
spouse in community but also by his son's claim to one-half of the interest
of her deceased husband. The total death benefits in that case amounted to
some $60,000. Assuming no debts or deductions and no other property,
the sons would have divided $15,000 between them (half their father's
interest) leaving only $45,000 to be divided between his two wives.
Examples could be multiplied, all of which would support the same
practical result: forced heirship simply does not fit when applied to
21. See Sims v. Sims, 349 So. 2d 974 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1977).
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retirement benefits. Should the non-employee spouse die and the employ-
ee thereafter become disabled prior to retirement, the prospect that the
decedent's heirs will thereafter share in disability benefits is almost
unthinkable. Accordingly, I strongly favor removing all deferred compen-
sation benefits from the claims of forced heirs.
Proposed legislation. Prompted by the decision on original hearing
in T.L. James, 22 the Louisiana Law Institute appointed a special commit-
tee to study the problems discussed above. Proposed legislation withdraw-
ing all retirement benefits from the operation of forced heirship was
adopted almost unanimously by the Council of the Law Institute but its
recommendation to the Legislature was deferred. The Council also ap-
proved but again deferred for submission to the Legislature valuation and
allocation provisions quite similar to those above recommended. The
proposed legislation would have rendered the interest of the non-employee
spouse personal to that spouse and thus not transmissable at death. As to
existing plans, a statute of repose would have required a non-employee
spouse who wished to transmit vested interests at death to make an express
claim to the administrator of the plan within a specified time. It is likely
that similar legislation will be proposed in the near future.
Conclusions. As long as it lasted, analogizing deferred compensa-
tion benefits to life insurance proceeds provided a convenient approach to
avoiding all of the foregoing difficulties. But perhaps that analogy was
unfair to the surviving spouse. Since the insurance solution has been
rejected, Louisiana finds itself aligned with the other community property
states, groping for a rational treatment of community interests. This
struggle has been heightened by the enigmatic Section 514(b) of ERISA 23
which, according to its terms and to its legislative history would preempt
state law in these areas. Although it is arguable that Congress intended to
create federal property rights in deferred compensation plans subject to
ERISA, I doubt that Section 514(b) would be so interpreted if challenged.
Indeed, recent Texas cases 24 indicate to the contrary. More than likely, it
remains to the community property states to work out the destiny of their
citizens in this regard.
22. On original hearing the supreme court held the non-testamentary designa-
tion form invalid.
23. U.S.C. § 514(b) (1974).
24. Kerbow v. Kerbow, and Richardson v. Richardson (D.C. N.D. Tex. Octo-
ber 8, 1976), reproduced in Bureau of National Affairs Pension Reporter, New
Decisions Nov. 22, 1976.
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The solutions are not simple but the problems will not go away.
Indeed, they appear to multiply. Those who would attack the problem
must realize that as to most of the employees affected, deferred compensa-
tion constitutes their single most valuable asset, their sole plan for com-
prehensive financial security and the only barrier to the economic ravages
of untimely death, total disability or inadequate retirement income.
Now that the problem has been exposed, its solution should not be
left to the courts. The situation seems to demand a legislative solution. I
recommend the approach outlined above.
